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WATSON V. FT. WORTH BANK AND TRUST." THE CHANGING
FACE OF DISPARATE IMPACT
LINDA L. HOLDEMAN*
I. INTRODUCTION.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 constitutes this country's
first serious commitment to eradicating the enormous economic disad-
vantages caused by hundreds of years of racial and gender-related preju-
dice. In July 1989, Title VII will be 25 years old.2 Its first 25 years have
seen significant changes in the economic opportunities available to
America's minorities and women. The most obvious forms of inten-
tional discrimination are largely gone. In 1989 it is a rare employer who
will admit racial or gender-related prejudice, even privately. 3 As a re-
sult, the percentages of mid-level jobs4 held by minorities and women
have greatly increased. 5 On Title VII's 25th Anniversary, there is much
cause for celebration.
But there is also cause for concern. While members of once ex-
cluded groups have entered the mid-level workforce, most have not
progressed to top-level positions. 6 Perhaps not surprisingly, the elimi-
nation of barriers to mid-level employment has spotlighted the unique
barriers to equal employment in top-level jobs. Title VII's capacity to
deal effectively with these barriers will be its major challenge for the
next quarter-century. Its success will depend, in large part, on the vital-
ity of the disparate impact proof model and its application to subjective
employment criteria. This article will identify the battleground and ana-
* Res. Instr., New York University; B.A. 1970, Florida State University; J.D. 1976,
University of Tennessee.
1. Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-16, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to -
2000e-17 (1982)). Title VII prohibits both public and private sector employment discrimi-
nation on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)
(1982). It not only creates and empowers the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion to enforce its requirements, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4 to -5 (1982), but it also creates a
private right of action by victims of discrimination against employers who have violated
Title VII's prohibitions. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1982). See Occidental Life Ins. Co. of
Cal. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 359-60 (1977); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S.
36, 45 (1974).
2. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e (1982), took effect on July 2,
1964.
3. See generally Bartholet, Proof of Discriminatory Intent Under Title VII United States Postal
Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1201, 1202-03 (1982).
4. Categories such as "mid-level" or "top-level" jobs defy definition. For purposes
of this article, "top-level" jobs will refer to the top third of an employer's work force using
salary, responsibility, visibility, and prestige as criteria. "Mid-level" jobs will refer to the
middle third of the work force, using the same criteria.
5. See generally Blumrosen, The Law Transmission System and the Southern Jurisprudence of
Employment Discrimination, 6 INDUS. REt.. L. J. 313, 336-39 (1984).
6. See Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARV. L. REV. 947
(1982).
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lyze the United States Supreme Court's struggle to define an impact
proof model applicable to subjective criteria.
II. HISTORY OF TITLE VII PROOF MODELS FOR INDIVIDUAL CASES
Title VII's tools for dealing with prohibited discrimination are its
proof models. Although proof models theoretically are designed merely
to facilitate the orderly consideration of relevant proof,7 they have sig-
nificant substantive impact. They define the levels of necessary proof,
utilize rebuttable presumptions, and explicitly interpret the substance of
the statute.
In the early years of Title VII litigation, the courts developed two
principal proof models8 for establishing an individual Title VII cause of
action: the disparate treatment model, and the disparate impact model.9
A. Disparate Treatment Model
The individual disparate treatment case is commonly considered
the classic discrimination case. 10 Under this theory, the plaintiff proves
that the employer has intentionally treated an employee less favorably
based upon a protected characteristic such as race or sex. ' The proof
model for an individual disparate treatment case proceeds in 3 stages:
(1) the plaintiff's primafacie case, (2) the defendant's claim of legitimate
business reason, and (3) the plaintiff's proof that the defendant's "legiti-
mate reason" was a mere pretext.
The first stage, the plaintiff's prima facie case, is so simple that it is
often treated by stipulation. For instance, in a case alleging discrimina-
tory hiring, the plaintiff need only prove:
(i) that he belongs to a [protected group]; (ii) that he applied
and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking
applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected;
and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open
and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of
complainant's qualifications.
12
7. International Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
8. The theory of perpetuation of the effects of past discrimination is not discussed in
this paper in light of its demise in Teamsters, id.. The proof model for failure to reasonably
accommodate religious practices is also omitted as it has limited practical relevance to the
issues discussed in this article.
9. In any given case, a plaintiff may proceed under both theories concurrently. See,
e.g., Wright v. National Archives and Records Serv., 609 F.2d 702, 710-11 (4th Cir. 1979)
(en banc).
10. The Supreme Court first applied the disparate impact theory in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), two years before setting out the individual disparate
treatment model in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
11. Disparate treatment... is the most easily understood type of discrimination.
The employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of
their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive
is critical, although it can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of
differences in treatment.
Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335-36 n.15 (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev.
Corp., 129 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977)).
12. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. McDonnell Douglas articulates the model in a
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The prima facie case raises an inference of discrimination by ruling
out the most common reasons for rejecting an applicant.' 3 In the sec-
ond stage of proof, in order to rebut this inference, the defendant need
only articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for plaintiff's
rejection.' 4 This is a burden of production only. The employer need
only present some evidence of a legitimate reason; he need not convince
the trier of fact that it was the real reason for the employment deci-
sion. 15 Thus, just as the plaintiff's primafacie task is relatively easy, the
defendant's stage two task is also relatively easy.
The heart of the individual disparate treatment case-where most
such cases are won or lost-is stage three. The plaintiff must prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the employer's articulated "legiti-
mate reason" was a "mere pretext" for discrimination. 16 In other
words, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant's true motive was
based upon the plaintiff's membership in a protected group. Because of
the subjective nature of intent, the increasing Title VII sophistication of
employers, and the defendant's exclusive knowledge of its own motives,
the plaintiff's burden at this stage of the disparate treatment case is
quite difficult.
B. Disparate Impact Model
While the individual disparate treatment model can be effective in
proving discrimination against a relatively unsophisticated employer
whose articulated motives are both illicit and transparent, it does little to
address the more subtle and invidious discrimination which results from
"artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers"' 17 to full employment.
These barriers are facially neutral but discriminatory in effect. Title VII
is, of course, intended to eliminate all unnecessary barriers to full
employment.18
In order to address such facially neutral employment practices, the
courts have applied the same sort of "disproportionate impact" analysis
which had previously been applied to Fourteenth Amendment cases. 19
The Supreme Court first applied disparate impact analysis in a Title VII
claim in the 1971 case of Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,20 and more fully set
out the elements of the proof model in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody.
2 '
Like the disparate treatment model, the disparate impact case pro-
hiring case. Comparable standards apply in promotion, firing, and conditions of employ-
ment cases.
13. Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978); Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 324.
14. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
15. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
16. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 807.
17. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
18. Id. at 431.
19. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974); Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379 (1971);
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir.
1977).
20. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
21. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
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ceeds in three stages; however, the first stage of an impact case is much
more burdensome than its counterpart in a disparate treatment prima
facie case. The plaintiff must demonstrate that a particular employment
device has an adverse impact on a protected group in marked dispropor-
tion 22 to its impact on employees outside that group. 23 This primafacie
case is almost entirely statistical. It often requires voluminous discov-
ery, thorough and detailed analysis of the employer's total organization
and operation, and expert testimony by statisticians, industrial psycholo-
gists, and personnel managers. The statistical comparisons must be
valid in terms of significance (based on a sample large enough to yield
reliable results), 2 4 scope (covering an appropriate category of employ-
ees), 2 5 and time (covering an appropriate length of time).
26
Under the Griggs/Albemarle proof model, once a plaintiff has estab-
lished a prima facie case of disparate impact, the burden of persuasion
(not merely the burden of production) shifts to the defendant to estab-
lish the business necessity 2 7 of the questioned employment practice.2 8
Like the plaintiff's initial task, this is usually a difficult undertaking. The
employer must show that the employment device is manifestly job re-
lated or necessary to his valid business purpose, despite its disparate
effect upon protected groups. The business necessity standard is usually
considered a higher standard than the corresponding standard (the ar-
ticulation of a legitimate non-discriminatory reason) in an individual dis-
parate treatment case.
29
22. The Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures have established a
suggested benchmark of eighty percent. A selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group
which is less than four-fifths (4/5) of the rate for the group with the highest rate will gener-
ally be regarded by the federal enforcement agencies as evidence of adverse impact. 29
C.F.R. § 1607.4 (1986). While the "80% rule" is not a precise formula for determining
adverse impact, it is a benchmark of prosecutorial discretion, Clady v. County of Los An-
geles, 770 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1985), and as part of the uniform guidelines, is entitled to
great deference by courts. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975).
23. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 424.
24. See, e.g., Kim v. Commandant, Defense Language Institute, 772 F.2d 521 (9th Cir.
1985); Soria v. Ozinga Bros., 704 F.2d 990 (7th Cir. 1983); Harper v. Trans World Air-
lines, Inc., 525 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1975).
25. See, e.g., Moore v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 708 F.2d 475, 482 (9th Cir. 1983);
Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 520 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1975).
26. See, e.g., Capaci v. Katz & Besthoff, 711 F.2d 647 (5th Cir. 1983); Roman v. ESB,
Inc., 550 F.2d 1343 (4th Cir. 1976); Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Proce-
dures, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.4, 1607.15 A(2) (1986).
27. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
But see B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw 1328-29 (2d ed.
1983) [hereinafter SCHLEI & GROSSMAN].
28. Of course, the defendant may also dispute the plaintiff's statistical analysis on the
impact issue. But the burden of persuasion on the impact issue does not shift, it remains
with the plaintiff.
29. The Supreme Court has neither precisely defined "business necessity" nor com-
pared it to "legitimate business reason." Most authorities, while recognizing the uncer-
tainty, view "business necessity" as a higher standard. L. MODJESKA, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW 49-53 (2d. ed. 1988); SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 27, at 1328-30;
Furnish, A Path Through the Maze: Disparate Impact and Disparate Treatment Under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 After Beazer and Burdine, 23 B.C.L. REV. 419 (1982); Rutherglen,
Disparate Impact Under Title VII. An Objective Theory of Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REV. 1298
(1987).
[Vol. 66:2
1989] THE CHANGING FACE OF DISPARATE IMPACT 183
Once the defendant has established the necessity of the employ-
ment device, the plaintiff, in the third and final stage, must prove that
there are other reasonable alternatives which would have less adverse
impact. 30 This proof may take the form of evidence showing that there
are reasonable alternatives to the particular skill or characteristic re-
quired, but more often the plaintiff will seek to prove that there are rea-
sonable alternatives to the criteria used to measure the required skill.
The difficulty of this proof stage will depend largely on the facts of each
particular case and such factors as how much less discriminatory the al-
ternative practice must be, how much and what kind of evidence will
establish the impact level of the alternative practice, and how adequately
the alternative practice must address the employer's needs. 3 '
C. Equal Employment in Top-level Jobs: Importance of Disparate Impact and
Subjective Criteria
Despite progress in equal opportunity for mid-level jobs, minorities
and women will remain second class members of the workforce until
equal opportunity is a reality in top-level jobs. But equal opportunity
encounters unique barriers at top employment levels. Some of these
barriers may not be directly related to current employment discrimina-
tion.3 2 However, few would dispute that racial and gender-related dis-
crimination is alive and well at the upper echelons of employment. And
few would dispute that the higher the job level, the more subjective are
the criteria for measuring potential for success. Therefore, it is evident
that Title VII's treatment of subjective criteria will be crucial to the
achievement of equal opportunity in top-level jobs.
3 3
Further, a number of factors combine to make the disparate impact
proof model the primary focus of the subjective criteria issue. First, the
more subjective the criteria, the more difficult it is to prove intent. This
is true not only from a purely evidentiary standpoint, but also because
"intent" is often difficult to define,3 4 particularly in the context of sub-
jective criteria for top-level jobs. 35 The murky issues of intent will be
30. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 424.
31. In the pre-Watson cases, these issues are not resolved; nor does Watson shed much
light in these areas. See infra section III (7).
32. For instance, successful applicants for top-level jobs usually need some combina-
tion of mid-level experience and/or particular skills and education. Regrettably, minori-
ties and women are still not equally represented in this applicant pool. Undoubtedly the
causes of this underrepresentation are varied and include time lag between increasing
mid-level employment and readiness for promotion, economic and cultural vestiges of
past discrimination, and personal lifestyle choices such as fulltime parenthood.
33. For the classic analysis of the relationship between disparate impact, subjective
criteria, and top-level jobs, see Bartholet, supra note 6.
34. See generally Bartholet, supra notes 3 & 6; Welch, Removing Discriminatory Barriers:
Basing Disparate Treatment Analysis on Motive Rather Than Intent, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 733
(1987).
35. For example, a university seeking to hire a dean would intentionally discriminate
by not hiring a black applicant because he is black. But does the university intentionally
discriminate on the basis of race by not hiring the black applicant because the search com-
mittee does not believe that the applicant possesses the cultural attributes which would
enable him to persuade potential donors to contribute scholarship funds to the university?
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affected by the importance of the employment position in question. The
more crucial the job, the more fact finders will tend to give employers
the benefit of the doubt on the question of intent. Thus, the disparate
treatment model is less useful for analysis of subjective decision-making.
In addition, the recent limitations on the availability of class ac-
tions36 have significantly reduced the viability of the pattern and prac-
tice suit;3 7 and this is particularly true for top-level jobs which, by their
nature are more distinctive and therefore less susceptible to class treat-
ment. Finally, recent years have seen a significant de-emphasis on af-
firmative action as a roncept, and a clear rejection of quotas as a "quick
fix" for thorny Title VII problems.3 8 The most appropriate remaining
analytical approach, then, is disparate impact analysis.
Thus, the dissection and evaluation of subjective decision-making,
especially in the context of the disparate impact proof model, will be a
key component of Title VII's next frontier-equal opportunity for top-
level jobs. The 1988 decision of Watson v. Ft. Worth Bank and Trust3 9 was
only the first step down a long and difficult road. As the next section
will explain, much remains undecided.
III. WATSON V. FT. WORTH BANK AND TRUST
A. Pre- Watson Uncertainties
Though the Supreme Court had never expressly limited disparate
impact's application, the Court had never applied impact analysis to sub-
jective decision-making. Prior Supreme Court disparate impact cases
had dealt with objective devices such as the requirement of a high school
diploma or an intelligence test,40 a height-weight requirement, 4 1 or a
written examination. 4 2 However, as plaintiffs searched for more effec-
tive ways to prove system wide discrimination, they sought to apply the
disparate impact proof model to subjective employment practices such
While it is certainly possible to analyze this issue in terms of intent, it is much more appro-
priately analyzed as a question of adverse impact and legitimate need for the criteria.
36. See General Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982); East Texas
Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriquez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977); Redditt v. Mississippi Ex-
tended Care Centers, Inc., 718 F.2d 1381 (5th Cir. 1983); Schwartz, The 1986 and 1987
Affirmative Action Cases: Its All Over But the Shouting, 86 MICH. L. REV. 524 (1987).
37. The "pattern and practice suit" is the proof model for a Title VII disparate treat-
ment class action. In a pattern and practice suit, the plaintiff must first show that disparate
treatment is the defendant's standard operating procedure. Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977). The defendant may then rebut the inference of discrimination
created by the plaintiff's statistics by attacking the plaintiff's statistics themselves, by at-
tacking the plaintiff's analysis of those statistics, or by offering an alternative statistical
analysis. Id. at 339-40.
38. See Watson v. Ft. Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988); Fullilove v. Klutz-
nick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443
U.S. 193 (1979); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Cf. Connecticut v.
Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
39. 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988).
40. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
41. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
42. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
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as subjective evaluation systems or hiring or promotion interviews.
43
Defendants argued that disparate impact analysis was inappropriate in
the context of a subjective system for a variety of reasons, 44 and soon
the circuit courts were widely split, some even vacillating internally.
45
The District of Columbia Circuit and the First, Second, Third, Sixth,
Seventh and Eleventh circuits concluded that application of disparate
impact analysis to subjective criteria is appropriate.4 6 The Fourth, Fifth,
Eighth, Ninth and Tenth circuits held that disparate impact analysis does
not apply to employment decisions based on subjective criteria;4 7 yet,
each of these five circuits has applied impact analysis to subjective deci-
sions in other cases. 48 The Supreme Court undertook to resolve the
issue of whether disparate impact could be applied to subjective employ-
ment decisions when it granted certiorari in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank
43. Infra note 46.
44. Infra notes 46-47.
45. Infra notes 46-47.
46. Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516 (11 th Cir. 1985) (promotion practice with subjec-
tive standards subject to disparate evaluations); Robinson v. Polaroid Corp., 732 F.2d
1010 (1st Cir. 1984) (layoff selection guidelines, including subjective evaluations of em-
ployees' knowledge, past performance, and future potential, evaluated for disparate im-
pact); Zahorik v. Cornell Univ., 729 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1984) (tenure decision involving
subjective peer evaluations upheld under disparate impact analysis); Coser v. Moore, 739
F.2d 746 (2d Cir. 1984) (prior experience requirements held to be job related, justifying
disparate impact on women professors and classified staff); Wilmore v. City of Wilming-
ton, 699 F.2d 667 (3rd Cir. 1983) (fire department promotions system, incorporating sub-
jective evaluations, found to be disparate impact on racial minorities); Rowe v. Cleveland
Pneumatic Co., Numerical Control Inc., 690 F.2d 88 (6th Cir. 1982) (rehire system giving
plant foremen unrestricted discretion not sufficiently job related to justify adverse impact);
United States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1977) (subjective requirements
including good character, moral conduct and lack of dissolute habits held to violate Title
VII due to disparate impact on blacks), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977); Green v. United
States Steel Corp., 570 F. Supp. 254 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (extended Wilmore, holding that an
unguided subjective hiring process, depending on interviewer's "gut-level reaction" to in-
dividual applicants, requires a more specific explanation to rebut prima fade showing of
disparate impact than the defendant's stated reason that he was seeking the best qualified
people).
47. Pope v. City of Hickory, 679 F.2d 20, 22 (4th Cir. 1982) (disparate impact model
only applies to specific procedures, usually a criterion for hiring); Mortensen v. Callaway,
672 F.2d 822, 823-24 (10th Cir. 1982) (subjective system where numerous factors were
combined to evaluate chemists for supervisory positions did not constitute neutral em-
ployment practice amenable to disparate impact analysis); Harris v. Ford Motor Co., 651
F.2d 609, 611 (8th Cir. 1981) (subjective decision-making system, such as supervisory eval-
uation of work quality, not the type of practice that can form the foundation of disparate
impact case); Heagney v. University of Wash., 642 F.2d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 1981) (dispa-
rate treatment model appropriate where gist of plaintiff's claim is use of subjective or ill-
defined criteria).
48. Hawkins v. Bounds, 752 F.2d 500 (10th Cir. 1985) (United States Post Office pro-
motion system, based on subjective prior "detailing" to upgraded jobs, subject to dispa-
rate impact analysis); Gilbert v. City of Little Rock, 722 F.2d 1390 (8th Cir. 1983)
(promotion system including oral interview and subjective performance appraisal invali-
dated due to disparate impact), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 972 (1984); Hung Ping Wang v. Hoff-
man, 694 F.2d 1146 (9th Cir. 1982) (predominately subjective promotion selection system
should be evaluated under disparate impact theory); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d
791 (4th Cir. 1971) (seniority system limiting promotion to employees with experience in
certain, typically all-white departments, violated Title VII under disparate impact model),
cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971). Even the Fifth Circuit has approved the use of dispa-
rate impact for a subjective selection system. Page v. United States Indus. Inc., 726 F.2d
1038, 1046 (5th Cir. 1984).




In 1973, Clara Watson was hired by Fort Worth Bank and Trust
(the "bank") as a proof operator. During the next seven years Watson
was promoted several times and byJanuary 1980, she held the position
of commercial teller. 50 During 1980 Watson applied, and was rejected,
for four promotions. On each occasion Watson's objective qualifica-
tions were similar to those of the successful white applicants.
5 1
The bank employed some eighty people in the Ft. Worth area. In
1973, when Watson was hired, there were only four other black employ-
ees. Two printed checks in the basement, one was a kitchen worker, and
the other was a porter. The bank had never had a black supervisor, let
alone a director or officer. Statistics showing hiring, salary, promotion
rates, and evaluation results showed marked disparities between blacks
and whites.
5 2
Regarding the positions sought by Watson in 1980, the bank had no
objective procedure for evaluating applicants, nor had there been any
attempt to identify the training, experience, and skills required for any
of the four positions. Each hiring decision was made by the manager
who would supervise the open position. After an interview, the manager
would simply make an intuitive decision from among the applicants, by
considering whatever subjective criteria that manager believed to be
relevant.53
After her fourth rejection, Watson exhausted her administrative
remedies and filed suit. She alleged that the bank had discriminated
against her and against similarly situated persons on the basis of race, in
contravention of Title VII.
5 4
The trial court initially certified the class under Federal Rule 23, but
decertified the class after trial because of lack of commonality and
numerosity. On the merits of Watson's individual claims, the trial court
refused to apply the disparate impact proof model to the subjective sys-
tem. Using the individual disparate treatment model, the trial court
found that Watson had established a prima facie claim of discrimination,
but had failed to establish pretext.
55
Watson appealed to the Fifth Circuit, arguing that the disparate im-
pact model should have been applied to her claims. Adhering to its re-
cent precedent of Pouncy v. Prudential Insurance Co. 56 and its progeny, the
Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court's ruling on the disparate impact is-
49. 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988).
50. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 798 F.2d 791 (5th Cir. 1986).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 808.
53. 108 S. Ct. at 2782.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 2783.
56. 668 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1982).
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sue. 5 7 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the disparate impact
issue alone, 58 and on June 29, 1988 the Court handed down a decision
which extended the disparate impact model to subjective practices. The
decision, however, left considerable doubt as to what disparate impact
now means.
C. The Watson Opinion
1. Overview of Opinion
Watson was heard by only eight Justices, but it produced three opin-
ions. They concur only insofar as they reaffirm the disparate impact
model and uphold its application to subjective criteria cases.
The plurality opinion, written by Justice O'Connor, did not ex-
pressly overturn any part of Griggs or other previously controlling dispa-
rate impact authorities. On the contrary, Justice O'Connor opined that
-[o]ur previous decisions offer guidance .... ,,59 She did not character-
ize her articulation as a modification even to adapt the old standards to a
new context, but rather as "a fresh and somewhat closer examination of
the constraints that operate to keep [disparate impact] analysis within its
proper bounds."' 60 Justice O'Connor's use of the present tense suggests
that she considered the constraints she was articulating to be already in
place, and that she considered her opinion to be an examination rather
than an expansion of them. She also stated that the point of this articu-
lation was "to explain in some detail why the evidentiary standards that
apply in these cases should serve as adequate safeguards against the
danger that Congress recognized." '6 1 The express intent of the opinion
was not to impose new standards, but to demonstrate why the old stan-
dards are adequate to protect the legitimate interests of employers,
without forcing them to use quotas or preferential treatment. The prob-
lem is that the language Justice O'Connor employed to articulate the
evidentiary burdens of the parties sometimes varied from the terminol-
ogy previously used in the impact precedents and can be read as an at-
tempt to redefine the proof model. This redefinition came over the
objection of the three Justice concurrence, and over Justice Stevens'
opinion that the elements of the proof model were not at issue in the
case.6 2 The core problem of the case is how to resolve these contradic-
tions in a reasoned and judicially sound manner. The ultimate fate of
the new definition, if indeed the plurality opinion is a new definition,
must await the next disparate impact case to be heard by a full Court.
63
57. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 798 F.2d 791 (5th Cir. 1986).
58. 107 S. Ct. 3227 (1987).
59. 108 S. Ct. at 2788.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Justice Stevens' opinion thus calls into question the precedential value of the plu-
rality's new standards since they may be considered dicta. There is further question as to
the precedential value of a plurality opinion.
63. For some of the issues raised by Watson, the wait may not be long. On June 30,
1988, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Atonio v. Ward's Cove Packing Co., 827
F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 2896 (1988) In Atonio, the Court will
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Though the Court was sympathetic to the Bank's argument that the
application of disparate impact analysis might force employers using
subjective criteria to secretly utilize quotas in order to insure against
disparate impact, all eight Justices agreed that application of disparate
impact analysis to subjecti e decision-making was essential to the vitality
of Title VII. 64 Justice 0' 4nnor observed that to hold otherwise would
largely nullify the disparate impact proof model even where objective
criteria were used. She wrote, "[s]o long as an employer refrained from
making standardized criteria absolutely determinative, it would remain
free to give such tests almost as much weight as it chose without risking
a disparate impact challenge." '6 5  The Court implicitly recognized that
society's interests in rational and fair economic decision-making, and in
equal employment opportunity would be undermined by a Title VII pol-
icy which tended to shield subjective employment practices from liability
exposure, while subjecting genuinely objective practices to close legal
scrutiny. Justice O'Connor further noted that there is no analytical im-
pediment to the application of impact analysis to subjective criteria,
since both objective and subjective criteria constitute "a facially neutral
practice, adopted without discriminatory intent, [but which] may have
effects that are indistinguishable from intentionally discriminatory prac-
tices." 6 6  Both from the standpoints of sound policy and conceptual
coherence, subjective criteria cases must be subject to disparate impact
analysis.
The four-Justice plurality recognized an employer's need for the
flexibility of subjective decision-making, even in the face of a statistically
disparate impact on a protected class, where the subjective practice has a
rational and legitimate basis. The plurality was also concerned that de-
fense of a disparate impact claim challenging a subjective employment
device would be unduly expensive and difficult, and that the extension
consider (1) the probative effect of statistical evidence regarding jobs not at issue, (2) the
placement of the burden of proof, and (3) the application of disparate impact analysis to a
system wide challenge of an employer's personnel practices.
64. 108 S. Ct. 2786-87.
65. Id. at 2786.
66. Id. The conceptual framework of the application of disparate impact to subjective
decision-making has been the subject of much commentary. See, e.g., D. BALDUS &J. COLE,
STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION 22-26 (Supp. 1984); SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra
note 27, at 191-205, 1288; Bartholet, supra note 6; Cooper, Title VII in the Academy: Barriers
to Equality for Faculty Women, 16 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 975, 991-95 (1983); Maltz, Title VII and
Upper Level Employment-A Response to Professor Bartholet, 77 Nw. U.L. REV. 776 (1983); Stacy,
Subjective Criteria in Employment Decisions Under Title VII, 10 GA. L. REV. 737 (1976); Wain-
troob, The Developing Law of Equal Employment Opportunity at the White Collar and Professional
Level, 21 WM. & MARY L. REV. 45 (1979); Comment, Subjective Employment Criteria and the
Future of Title VII in Professional Jobs, 54 U. DET. J. URB. L. 165 (1976); Note, Title VII and
Employment Discrimination in "Upper Level "Jobs, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1614 (1973). Nor is Jus-
tice O'Connor's conclusion completely self-evident. There are fundamental differences
between a subjective selection device and an objective device, particularly for purposes of
disparate impact analysis. The disparate impact model analyzes the specific selection de-
vice for discriminatory effect. In the context of an objective device, this sort of analysis is
conceptually simple, because the device is the same whether applied by a single supervisor
or by a number of supervisors. Not so with a subjective device. As a matter of fact, one
could say that a subjective device applied by five different supervisors is actually five differ-
ent selection devices, despite the fact that they are all described by the same words.
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of disparate impact analysis to subjective decision-making would result
in the use of "surreptitious quota systems" 6 7 in order to insure impact-
free statistics.6 8 To extend the disparate impact proof model to subjec-
tive practices without forcing employers to use quotas, the plurality "re-
examined" the proof model in some depth. Whether the plurality ap-
preciably weakened the model is not a question subject to simple resolu-
tion. It is necessary to look closely at each element of the "re-
examined" proof model. It appears that some change in the model was
intended. Some changes may prove more cosmetic than substantive,
and some changes await clarification. The effect of most will depend on
case-by-case implementation by trial courts.
The O'Connor opinion first addressed the plaintiff's prima facie
case. The plurality expressly required the plaintiff to identify the em-
ployment practice which is alleged to be discriminatory, and emphasized
that the plaintiff must prove the causal link between the challenged prac-
tice and the disparate impact. Second, the plurality re-articulated the
employer's response necessary to counter such a prima facie case. The
traditional "business necessity" test was, however, clouded by language
suggesting that the employer need only show that the challenged prac-
tice is justified by "legitimate business reasons." The plurality expressly
held that the use of the challenged employment practice need not be
defended with formal validation studies. Moreover, the defendant's
burden on those elements may have been reduced to a mere burden of
production and not of persuasion. Finally, the plurality opinion offered
no guidance as to just what a plaintiff must show in order to establish
that an employer's legitimate interests would be adequately served by an
alternative, non-discriminatory practice.
Justice Blackmun's opinion, in which Justices Brennan and Marshall
joined, squarely rejected the new articulation of the impact proof model.
They adhered to the precedent of Griggs6 9 and Albemarle70 as the defini-
tive statements of the elements of a disparate impact case. This concur-
ring opinion particularly stressed that the defendant's rebuttal burden is
one of persuasion rather than production of evidence, and criticized any
attempt by the plurality to relax the standards for validation of subjec-
tive criteria.
Justice Stevens also declined to endorse the plurality's new articula-
67. 108 S. Ct. at 2787.
68. The possibility that a more stringent disparate impact proof model will signifi-
cantly reduce the surreptitious use of quotas is questionable. While tougher proof stan-
dards will increase the difficulty of a disparate impact plaintiff's case, it is far from obvious
that new standards will significantly reduce the number of claims brought. Faced with the
necessity to defend, few employers would significantly weaken their defense efforts based
upon the assessment that their ultimate odds of success are better. This is particularly true
since the new standards themselves are subjective and few employers will be certain
enough of the outcome at trial to risk the high consequences of losing an impact case. It
will still be less expensive and more effective to insure that the prima facie statistical case
can not be made.
69. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
70. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
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tion of the proof model. He argued that discussion of"evidentiary stan-
dards" should await another day when those issues are before the Court.
Essentially, this concurring opinion is significant in two respects. First,
it deprived the O'Connor opinion of majority status. Second, it under-
lined the fact that the plurality opinion may be viewed as dicta to the
extent that it rearticulated, if not redefined, the elements of the proof
model.
7 1
2. The Identification Requirement
The plurality noted that the plaintiff must identify the objectionable
employment practice as an element of the prima facie case.72 While this
element may not have been so clearly articulated in Griggs,7 3 and Al-
bemarle74 the requirement of identification of an objectionable employ-
ment practice was, at least implicitly, an element of a disparate impact
case before Watson. 75 However, it is not entirely clear how specific the
Watson plurality requires the plaintiff to be, and the degree of specificity
is crucial at the point of proving the causal link between the practice and
the disparate impact.
76
It is here that we must be most precise in defining and using termi-
nology. Assume a multi-component hiring procedure which combines:
(1) a degree requirement, (2) a check of references, and (3) an interview.
The interviews are conducted by a single decision-maker who subjec-
tively measures the applicant using a list of criteria such as ability to
communicate, leadership, ability to relate well with others, professional
appearance, and attitude. There is a system for recording the inter-
viewer's subjective assessments by ranking on a scale of one to six. A
formula assigning relative weight for each component then guides the
final decision. The decision is still substantially the result of subjective
judgments, but the decision-making process is fairly well documented.
In such a case, the Watson plurality would certainly require a plaintiff
to do more than show that overall hiring statistics are disparate. The
plaintiff would be able to, and therefore would be expected to, for exam-
ple, assess whether the degree requirement itself had an adverse impact,
71. See also supra note 58.
72. 108 S. Ct. at 2788.
73. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 424.
74. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 405.
75. All prior cases in which the Supreme Court applied disparate impact analysis have
focused on specific components of a selection device. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Teal, 457
U.S. 440 (1982) (written examination as a screening device for promotion); New York City
Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) (exclusion of methadone users); Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 405 (a pre-employment test).
76. The Court requires only identification of the "practice," and does not specify that
the criterion must be isolated. The Court supported the identification requirement on the
authority of Teal, which involved a two-step selection process. In that case, the first screen-
ing had an adverse impact, but the second step compensated for the adverse impact. The
Court applied impact analysis separately to the first step. So in such a system, it is clearly
important to focus on a rationally separate and discrete step in the total process. Beyond
that, the Watson opinion does not say how specific the identification must be.
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since that impact is amenable to objective measurement. 7 7 The plaintiff
would be able to identify, and therefore would be expected to identify,
which of the three components adversely impacted a protected group,
since the final formula assigning numerical values and weights to each
component would allow that impact to be tracked. The plaintiff could
theoretically even assess the impact of each subjective criterion, if the
subjective assessment of each were separately ranked. However, if the
criteria were not separately ranked, a plaintiff could not identify which
criteria had adverse impact. 78 If the relative weight of each component
practice (degree requirement, reference check, and interview) is not
identified, a plaintiff could not identify which component had adverse
impact. The difficulty is evident. An employer could insulate a selection
procedure from disparate impact challenge by making the procedure
completely subjective 79 or simply by refraining from memorializing the
decision-making process by ranking the subjective judgments and
weighting the components. Certainly this method of preventing a dispa-
rate impact challenge would be far easier than using quotas and there-
fore, a far more real danger to the ultimate viability of the proof model.
The degree of specificity possible will vary widely from case to case.
In a two-step selection device, it is certainly possible to identify the ob-
jectionable step. 80 In a case involving multiple subjective criteria, the
plaintiff could never prove which subjective criterion was associated in
the employer's mind with a Title VII protected group unless the practice
included sufficient ranking and record-keeping procedures. In such a
case, it would certainly be inappropriate to require the plaintiff to iden-
tify which criterion produced the disparate impact.
Such a construction would sound the death knell of impact analysis
in the subjective criteria context, which the Court recognizes would ef-
fectively end the efficacy of impact analysis in the objective criteria con-
text as well. 8 1 This is precisely what the Watson decision refused to
allow, so the requirement of specific identification must be circum-
scribed with an appropriate rule of reason, to accomplish the primary
goal of the decision-the preservation of a viable disparate impact
model.
77. A degree requirement is analogous to the test requirement in Teal, id. Where
either criteria is an absolute requirement, its impact can be assessed. Where either is sim-
ply a factor to be considered along with other criteria, its impact can not be assessed ab-
sent a ranking system or formula which prescribes and memorializes the decision-making
process.
78. Ironically, that is particularly true where subjective criteria are involved, as the
Court has recognized that it is subconscious stereotyping that causes such subjective crite-
ria to produce unlawful disparate impact. Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2786. The plaintiff cannot
reasonably be required to identify which subjective criteria are associated in the em-
ployer's mind with an unfair stereotype. The only way to prove such an association would
be if the same decision-maker evaluated the employment pool multiple times, excluding
one criteria each time in order to produce a statistical basis for analysis.
79. Le., by simply using an intuitive decision-making procedure, relying totally on un-
bridled discretion.
80. See Teal, supra note 75.
81. Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2786.
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The best reading appears to be that the degree of required specific-
ity must be determined on a case by case basis, depending primarily on
how specific it is possible to be. It is never sufficient for the plaintiff to
merely allege a statistical imbalance in the employer's workforce.8 2 The
plaintiff must make some showing that the defendant's practices have
caused this imbalance,8 3 and the identification of the offending practice
will be more or less specific depending on the nature of the challenged
practice. The identified practice will often be the inverse of the alterna-
tive practice which the plaintiff must offerin stage three of the case. A
plaintiff proposing a set of objective criteria in stage three would argue
in stage one that the failure to circumscribe employment decisions with
such criteria is the offending practice. A plaintiff who accepts the need
for subjective criteria for the job involved might argue that appropriate
training of the decision-maker would avoid disparate impact, so the fail-
ure to provide such training would be the offending practice. Similarly,
a plaintiff might challenge the employer's failure to screen its decision-
maker for racial or sexual bias, or for the failure to require an independ-
ent review of subjective decisions as a guard against illicit bias. These
examples demonstrate that a reasoned construction of the identification
requirement will not prove an undue burden for plaintiffs. Even in
those cases where the offensiveness of the practice is cloaked in the prac-
tice's amorphous character, the burden is really no greater than what
has always been imposed by stage three of the proof model-proof of
the existence of non-discriminatory alternatives.
3. The Causation Requirement
The plurality stated that plaintiffs must prove a causal link between
the challenged practice and the disparate impact.8 4 At first glance, this
might seem to be a difficult burden in the context of subjective practices.
However, the plurality explained that such proof is largely a matter of
showing a statistical disparity "sufficiently substantial ... [to] raise such
an inference of causation." 8 5 The Court elaborated on this element of
proof by reiterating the well-established principles governing the statis-
tical analysis of the case. "[S]mall or incomplete data sets and inade-
quate statistical techniques" will not prove causation. Statistics must be
based on the applicant pool exclusive of applicants lacking minimal job
qualifications.8 6 The plurality was articulating in terms of causation the
same requirements which earlier opinions have articulated in terms of
defining a disparate impact.
8 7
The more significant question relates to the degree to which plain-
82. Id. at 2788.
83. See infra Part 111(3).
84. Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2788-89.
85. Id. at 2789.
86. Id. at 2790.
87. See, e.g., New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) (insufficiency
of statistics to show impact of exclusion of methadone users); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433
U.S. 321 (1977) (sufficiency of statistics to show impact of height/weight requirement).
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tiffs must, for purposes of a prima facie case, prove the lack of other
causes for the statistical imbalance. The plurality was clearly concerned
that:
It is completely unrealistic to assume that unlawful discrimina-
tion is the sole cause of people failing to gravitate to jobs and
employers in accord with the laws of chance. It would be
equally unrealistic to suppose that employers can eliminate, or
discover and explain, the myriad of innocent causes that may
lead to statistical imbalances in the composition of their work
forces.
88
The Watson plurality thus emphasized that the disparate impact proof
model does not require an employer to prove causes for statistical im-
balance other than the challenged employment practice.
It is important to note that the Griggs/Albemarle articulation has
never required an employer to prove the lack of causation. When de-
fendants have offered causation proof, it has always been as rebuttal to
the plaintiff's causation proof in the prima facie case. The burden of
proof on causation has never shifted to the Title VII defendant.
The Watson plurality opinion may stand for the proposition that,
where a plaintiff's statistical analysis of the impact of the challenged
practice is not otherwise sufficient to prove causation, a plaintiff may be
required to disprove other possible causes. However Justice
O'Connor's primary point on causation is simply that the burden of
proof does not shift to the defendant, but remains with the plaintiff
through all stages of the proof model.8 9
Therefore, the plurality's discussion of causation did not create a
new standard. Rather, the opinion emphasized that statistical proof
must be sufficient to show causation, and that the employer is never re-
quired to shoulder the burden of proof on causation. Both principles
were already a part of the pre-Watson model.
4. Legitimate Business Reasons
In order to rebut a primafacie case of disparate impact, an employer
has traditionally been required to defend the challenged practice by a
showing of "a manifest relationship to the employment in question" 90
or a "genuine business need." 9 ' The Watson plurality referred approv-
ingly to the Griggs/Albemarle "business necessity or job relatedness" de-
fense 92 as one of the constraints on disparate impact, which insures that
employers will not have to use quotas or preferential treatment.
9 3
88. Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2787 (citation omitted).
89. It is also important not to confuse the plurality's discussion of causation with the
issue of proper allocation of burden of proof on job relatedness. Infra at Part 111(5).
90. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
91. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432; Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 434.
92. The two terms have traditionally been used interchangeably. Connecticut v. Teal,
457 U.S. 440, 446 (1982); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432; SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 27, at
1329-30.
93. Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2791.
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Hence, it would appear that the "business necessity" standard ofjustifi-
cation was reaffirmed.
9 4
But the viability of that standard was then called into question
within the same paragraph by the plurality's odd use of disparate treat-
ment language to introduce its discussion of stage three:
[Wihen the defendant has met its burden of producing evi-
dence that its employment practices are based on legitimate busi-
ness reasons .... 95
The term "legitimate business reasons" was not defined or explained in
the opinion. Nor was the phrase supported by a citation to precedent
which would clarify its meaning in this context. This language, taken at
face value, might indicate a lowering of the traditional "business neces-
sity" standard.9 6 However, a better reading is that the plurality was not
really deviating from the pre-Watson standard. If "legitimate business
reasons" were construed as a lower standard, the opinion would be in-
coherent, as it also affirmed the "business necessity standard." In the
sentence preceding the "legitimate business reasons" clause, the plural-
ity expressly reaffirmed the more specific articulation of this burden.
The term "legitimate business reasons" was used only in an introduc-
tory clause for another element of the proof model. The standard which
the court clearly articulated for stage two is "manifest job relatedness,"
citing Griggs with approval. 9 7 So the plurality opinion should not be
read as diminishing this burden.
5. Burden Of Production
The same subordinate clause which introduced the "legitimate
business reasons" terminology also spoke of the defendant as having a
"burden of producing evidence" to rebut the prima facie case. At this
stage of the case, the pre-Watson proof model required the defendant to
prove manifest job relatedness-not merely to produce evidence. 9 8 The
issue is whether the plurality was actually purporting to modify this stan-
dard to a mere burden of production. In disparate treatment cases,
which use the "legitimate business reasons" language, the employer
does has only a burden of production, so there is some reason to believe
94. In the specific context of subjective criteria, the use of such criteria will usually be
justifiable for those upper echelon positions from which women and minorities are still
being excluded. Id. However, the plaintiff may effectively challenge the manner in which
such criteria are measured. For example, it might be argued that some "subjective" traits
are actually measurable by psychological testing, that training of the decision-maker could
minimize the unfair stereotyping which causes disparate impact, that screening of deci-
sion-makers to avoid illicit bias could lessen disparate impact, or that independent review
of employment decisions could counteract the effect of such bias. Cases challenging sub-
jective decision-making per se will be viable only for those jobs where objective perform-
ance tests are feasible. Most subjective practice cases will turn on the employment
procedures rather than the criteria being used.
95. Id. at 2790 (emphasis added).
96. See supra note 29.
97. Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2790.
98. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
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that the Watson plurality articulated a new and lowered standard for dis-
parate impact.
However, there are also reasons to conclude that the defendant's
burden is still the same. The plurality never suggested that it was chang-
ing the burden, but purported to be articulating well-settled standards.
The sentence containing the "burden of production" language cited
with approval Albemarle Paper Co. which holds that the employer has the
burden of proving job relatedness. 99 The previous sentence stated that
"an employer has the burden of showing that any given requirement
must have a manifest relationship to the employment in question," cit-
ing Griggs which also places such a burden of proof on the defendant.10 0
The better reading is that the Watson plurality acknowledged that
the defendant has this burden of proof, and merely stressed that the
burden of proving the fact that discrimination (that is, disparate impact)
has been caused by a particular practice never shifts. The plurality opin-
ion states:
Although we have said that an employer has "the burden of
showing that any given requirement must have a manifest rela-
tionship to the employment in question," . . . such a formula-
tion should not be interpreted as implying that the ultimate
burden of proof can be shifted to the defendant. On the con-
trary, the ultimate burden of proving that discrimination
against a protected group has been caused by a specific em-
ployment practice remains with the plaintiff at all times.' 0 '
The issue on which the burden of proof remains with the plaintiff is the
causation issue. This does not deviate from settled precedent, and does
not necessitate lessening the defendant's burden on the issue of job
relatedness.
The plurality articulated no intent to change the burden and offered
no articulated reason for varying from that burden in subjective practice
cases. In fact, the Court observed that the employer will often find it
easier in the context of subjective practices to show job relatedness than
in the context of objective practices. 10 2 So the extension of the proof
model to subjective cases provides no reason to lighten the job related-
ness burden.
Moreover, the plurality's passing use of the word "producing" does
not rise to the level of a coherently defined burden of production. True
burdens of production should state the quantum of evidence to be pro-
duced, since those quanta may be of varying degrees. A party may face a
burden to produce a scintilla of evidence, significant evidence, substan-
tial evidence, or any other quantum the court may prescribe. If the Wat-
son language prescribed a burden of production, it created a problem for
lower courts by failing to prescribe the quantum of evidence required.
99. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 425.
100. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
101. Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2790 (quoting from Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432).
102. Id. at 2791.
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Still, footnote two of Justice O'Connor's opinion implied that the
plurality intended to change some of the evidentiary standards. The
plurality stated that "each verbal formulation used in prior opinions to
describe the evidentiary standards" in disparate impact cases may not
"automatically apply" in light of Watson. The difference between "busi-
ness necessity" and "legitimate business reasons" may be a mere differ-
ence in verbal formulation. However, the difference between a burden
of proof and burden of production is certainly more than a mere differ-
ence in "verbal formulation." Considering the case as a whole, the bet-
ter view is that the employer still has the burden of proof on the issue of
job relatedness. However, the opinion is far from clear, and one would
hope that the Court will resolve this issue at its earliest opportunity.1
0 3
6. Validation Studies
In addition to raising questions as to the quantum of evidence re-
quired to rebut a prima facie impact case, the plurality opinion left open
the question of the kind of evidence which the employer must produce.
The job relatedness of most objective criteria is measurable by valida-
tion studies. However, the Bank in Watson contended that subjective
practices are not amenable to such validation studies. The plurality
opinion was again somewhat inconsistent in its discussion of this issue.
It began by noting that "[s]tandardized tests and criteria, like those at
issue in our previous disparate impact cases, can often be justified
through formal 'validation studies,' which seek to determine whether
discrete selection criteria predict actual on-the-job performance."
' 10 4
Yet the plurality went on to acknowledge the employer's concern that
the defense of subjective criteria with formal validation studies would
often be impossible, or at least so expensive as to be impracticable. The
plurality responded to this concern by stating that formal validation
studies have never been absolutely required, even in the objective prac-
tice context.' 0 5 In terms of the subjective cases, the opinion proceeded:
In the context of subjective or discretionary employment
decisions, the employer will often find it easier than in the case
of standardized tests to produce evidence of a "manifest rela-
tionship to the employment in question." It is self-evident that
many jobs, for example those involving managerial responsibil-
ities, require personal qualities that have never been consid-
ered amenable to standardized testing.
10 6
Thus, the plurality opinion resolved the defendant's concern that formal
validation studies would be unduly expensive by clarifying that such vali-
103. It is possible that the Court will resolve this issue more clearly in Atonio v. Ward's
Cove Packing Co., 827 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 2896 (1988), dur-
ing the Spring term of 1989. However, the employers in Alonio have not directly argued
that a Title VII defendant does not have the burden of proof on job relatedness. Atonio
may turn instead on the lower court's ruling as to a shifting of burden of proof on
causation.
104. Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2787.
105. Id. at 2790-91.
106. Id. at 2791.
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dation studies are not always required. Beyond that, however, the plu-
rality opinion gave the lower courts little guidance as to what kinds of
evidence may be adequate to validate employment practices. The plu-
rality recognized the availability of formal validation studies to measure
the job relatedness of a practice. It implicitly recognized and affirmed
the use of such validation studies in appropriate contexts, citing Al-
bemarle Paper Co. with approval. 10 7 It is clear that such evidence is still
appropriate. On the other hand, the plurality contemplated that some
subjective practices (or at least some subjective criteria) will be so mani-
festly job related that job relatedness is "self-evident."' 0 8 This implies
that little or no evidence will be needed to justify the employer's prac-
tice. 10 9 In the absence of more specific guidance from the Court, it
seems that the lower courts are left to resolve on a case-by-case basis the
questions of the degree and manner of proof required to establish mani-
fest job relatedness. 110
The plurality has not so much articulated a new standard governing
the kind of evidence required for the rebuttal case as it has recited the
flexibility of the pre-Watson standard, and extended that flexibility even
further in light of the extension of the proof model into new and even
more varied employment practices. Some practices, and particularly
some criteria, may be easily justified without formal validation studies,
but some subjective practices may be subject to more scientific valida-
tion procedures."I ' The plurality decision could be read as holding
that scientific proof is not required even when available. 1 12 However, it
is not reasonable to construe the plurality opinion as relieving defend-
ants of the responsibility to produce whatever evidence of job related-
ness is reasonably available and probative.
7. Alternative Practices
If the employer succeeds in validating its employment practice, the
107. Id. at 2787.
108. Id. at 2791.
109. The kind of practice falling between these two ends of the continuum, and the
kind of evidence required to validate such a practice is an open question.
110. Lower courts will need to consider the specific practice which is being challenged
in deciding the kind of evidence which will defend it. While certain subjective criteria may
be self-evidently and manifestly related to a managerial job, the method of measuring the
employee against that criteria may be the subject of challenge. The Court has given no
guidance as to what kind of evidence will be required to validate the application aspect of
the practice, as distinguished from the criteria aspect. Since the criteria aspect will ordina-
rily be so easy for the employer to defend, it is likely that most of these cases will focus on
the application aspect.
11. Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2795. The brief of the American Psychological Association,
submitted as amicus curiae in Watson, sets out methods for what it calls "scientific valida-
tion" of subjective devices such as job interviews. Brief of American Psychological Ass'n at
4-22, Watson v. Ft. Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988) (No. 86-6139). See also
Bartholet, supra note 6, at 987-88.
112. Such a reading of Watson would have little practical effect if the defendant's bur-
den on the issue of job relatedness remains one of persuasion. If the plaintiff produces
competent scientific evidence of invalidity of a practice, the defendant will probably need
competent scientific evidence to counter it, even in the absence of a rigid rule requiring
formal validation as an element of the rebuttal case.
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burden falls on the plaintiff to offer a non-discriminatory alternative
practice which the employer could have used. The questions unan-
swered by the Watson plurality opinion are: (a) how much less discrimi-
natory must the alternative practice be, (b) what kind of evidence will
support that practice, in light of the fact that the practice was not used
and both the employer's practice and the suggested alternative will often
be at least partly subjective, and (c) how adequately must the alternative
practice address the employer's legitimate business interests?
As for the degree to which the alternative practice must diminish
the disparate impact, the Court was silent. Presumably, this issue is left
to be resolved on the same case-by-case basis which the plurality has
prescribed for evaluating the disparity of impact in the prima facie
case.' 1 3 With regard to the nature of proof on this inherently specula-
tive question, the only way to preserve the validity of the impact model
is to allow the plaintiff a good deal of latitude. The plaintiff challenging
a subjective practice will usually be challenging the procedure rather
than the criteria, 1 14 and the plaintiff will usually be forced to rely, in
stage three, on expert testimony that certain types of procedures usually
have less adverse impact than the procedures used by the defendant. Of
course, the defendant will seek to produce opposing expert testimony.
However, all of this evidence will, of necessity, be relatively speculative.
The issue on which the language of the plurality opinion is most
confusing is that of how adequate the alternative practice must be from
the standpoint of the employer's legitimate interest. Initially, the plural-
ity stated, "the plaintiff must show that other tests or selection devices,
without a similarly undesirable racial effect, would also serve the em-
ployer's legitimate interest in efficient and trustworthy
workmanship." "15
However, in the next sentence the plurality recited factors pertinent
to "determining whether [the alternative practice] would be equally as effec-
tive as the challenged practice in serving the employer's legitimate busi-
ness goals."11 6 While this language could be read as a holding that even
a de minimis difference in cost, convenience, or efficiency could justify a
severely discriminatory practice notwithstanding the availability of sub-
stantially adequate and non-discriminatory alternatives, this reading is
certainly not a reasoned approach. Proof of equal effectiveness, if
strictly and narrowly construed, would rarely be possible. Further, this
reading of Watson would elevate the most trivial interest of the employer
above the plaintiff's and society's interests in equal employment oppor-
113. Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2788.
114. See supra Part 111(5).
115. Watson, 108 S. Ct. 2790 (emphasis added) (citing with approval Albemarle, 422 U.S.
at 425).
116. Id. (emphasis added). The next sentence states that those factors would be perti-
nent to determining whether the challenged practice is "thefunctional equivalent of pretext for
discriminatory treatment." Id. The standard and function of stage three is further compli-
cated by this disparate treatment language, again blurring the two models and harkening
back to intent. See infra note 135.
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tunity, and that cannot be the intent of a decision extending the dispa-
rate impact model beyond its prior scope. Nor does the plurality
opinion state that strict equality of effectiveness is the test. Rather the
Albemarle Paper Co. standard is affirmed.
The question must remain one of reasonableness. Such factors as
the cost, convenience, and efficiency of the competing practices must be
balanced against the difference in the degree of disparate impact af-
fected by the competing practices in order to determine whether the use
of the challenged practice was discriminatory.17
D. Precedential Value and Scope of Application of the New Disparate Impact
Articulation
The fact that Watson is a plurality decision calls into question its
precedential value."18 It is well settled that affirmances by an equally
divided Court do not bind lower courts as to principles of law."1 9 But
the precedential value of decisions where no single rationale is em-
braced by a majority of the Court presents a more difficult issue. The
"holding" of the Court, in such cases, is defined as "the position taken
by those members who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest
grounds."' 20 Just what constitutes the "narrowest grounds" is unclear.
Some have suggested that the narrowest opinion is that which, because
it does not enunciate broad rules of law, renders the decision applicable
to the fewest number of cases.121 Under this definition, Justice Stevens'
concurrence in Watson would be the holding of the case since he
postpones the enunciation of evidentiary standards for another day. An-
other approach is to view the narrowest opinion as the one which de-
parts least from the status quo.' 2 2 Under this standard, the opinion of
Justice Blackmun could be considered the holding, since it merely re-
peats the evidentiary standards in earlier disparate impact cases.
Not only is the precedential value of the plurality unclear, but the
scope of its application is also unclear. The opinion avoided the issue
as to whether its redefinition of disparate impact was intended to apply
only to subjective criteria cases, or to all cases of facially neutral employ-
ment practices.
The express reason for the rearticulation was clearly occasioned by
117. This notion of balancing has not been explicitly discussed by the Court, but it has
sometimes been implicit in earlier opinions. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 335
(1977) (balancing strength of evidence on business necessity with consequences of incor-
rect decision).
118. Further, the plurality's discussion of the evidentiary standards applicable to dispa-
rate impact analysis is dicta.
119. See, e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S.
205 (1910).
120. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976). See also Marks v. United States,
430 U.S. 193 (1977).
121. Note, The Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 80 COLUM. L. REV.
756, 763 (1980).
122. Id. at 764.
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the application of disparate impact analysis to subjective employment
practices. Justice O'Connor stated in footnote two:
[W]e believe that this step [of extension to subjective employ-
ment practices] requires us to provide the lower courts with ap-
propriate evidentiary guidelines, as we have previously done
for disparate treatment cases. Moreover, we do not believe that
each verbal formulation used in prior opinions to describe the
evidentiary standards in disparate impact cases is automatically
applicable in light of today's decision. . . . This congressional
mandate [against preferential treatment and quotas] requires in
our view that a decision to extend the reach of disparate impact
theory be accompanied by safeguards against the result that
Congress clearly said it did not intend.
123
This language emphasizes that the evidentiary guidelines are in-
tended to minimize the risk that extension of the proof model to subjec-
tive practice cases would force employers using subjective practices to
adopt secret quotas. The use of the word "automatically" indicates that
the pre-Watson evidentiary standards may still be viable in some cases,
but may not apply in others. Thus, the pre-Watson standards may still
apply in the objective criteria context but not in the subjective criteria
context.
Justice O'Connor also introduced the rearticulation by stating:
We recognize, however, that today's extension of that theory
into the context of subjective selection practices could increase
the risk that employers will be given incentives to adopt quotas
or to engage in preferential treatment. Because Congress has
so clearly and emphatically expressed its intent that Title VII
not lead to this result, we think it imperative to explain in some
detail why the evidentiary standards that apply in these cases
should serve as adequate safeguards against the danger that
Congress recognized.
12 4
The antecedent to "these cases" may well be "subjective selection pro-
cedures," another indication that the new standards are required only
because of the particular dangers of application to subjective criteria.125
It is noteworthy that Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion seems
to understand the plurality's new articulation of the evidentiary stan-
dards as applying only to subjective employment practices. He stated:
In so doing, [extending disparate impact analysis to subjective
practices] the plurality projects an application of disparate im-
pact analysis to subjective employment practices that I find to
be inconsistent with the proper evidentiary standards and with
the central purpose of Title VII.1
26
He then went on to call for the traditional statement of disparate impact
123. Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2788 n.2.
124. Id. at 2788 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
125. The ambiguity as to the scope of the applicability of the Watson standard is noted
in Note, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term-Leading Cases, 102 HARV. L. REv. 143, 308, 316
(1988).
126. Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2792 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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evidentiary standards to subjective criteria cases. 127 Even more intrigu-
ing is Justice O'Connor's citation to Justice Blackmun's concurrence:
Moreover, we do not believe that each verbal formulation used
in prior opinions to describe the evidentiary standards in dispa-
rate impact cases is automatically applicable in light of today's
decision. Cf. post, at 2791, (Blackmun, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment).1
2 8
Justice O'Connor's use of the signal "Cf," generally used to introduce
authority which is sufficiently similar to the author's proposition that the
cited authority lends support to the author's proposition, may indicate
agreement between the plurality and Justice Blackmun's concurrence on
the question of the scope of application of the plurality's standards.
Finally, the specific changes in the evidentiary standards appear to
be adaptations designed to address the unique problems presented by
subjective employment practices, and seem to be unwarranted in the
context of objective practices. The Court recognized that objective cri-
teria can be evaluated by formal validation studies. However, subjective
criteria may not be so scientifically verifiable. Hence, the Court re-ar-
ticulated and arguably relaxed the validation element of the defendant's
rebuttal case.129 This relaxation is clearly intended for subjective crite-
ria cases, and the Court's recognition of the availability of better evi-
dence regarding objective criteria belies any claim that these new
evidentiary standards are meant to apply in the objective criteria con-
text. Also, the plurality expressly required that in cases of mixed subjec-
tive and objective criteria, the specific objectionable practice must be
isolated.' 3 0 The Court did not explain this particular need for specific
identification,13' but it may be surmised that the need to isolate the spe-
cific component is especially necessary in this context because somewhat
different evidentiary standards will apply to different practices depend-
ing on whether they are subjective or objective.
Yet, there are also indications that the new standards are applicable
to all disparate impact cases. The Court recognized that subjective and
objective practices are conceptually similar in that they are facially neu-
tral but may adversely impact a protected class. 132 And the plurality's
discussion of the newly articulated standards referred to "the standards
of proof in disparate impact cases," without limiting the scope of this
phrase to subjective practices. 133 The practical difficulties of distin-
guishing between subjective and objective criteria (particularly in a
multi-component system) and applying two different versions of the
proof model may simply be unworkable.
127. Id. at 2792-97.
128. Id. at 2788 n.2.
129. Id. at 2790.
130. Id. at 2788.
131. Watson was not a case of mixed subjective and objective criteria. It challenged
only subjective criteria.
132. Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2786.
133. Id. at 2791.
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In the final analysis, it is most likely that the Court has simply not
decided which, if any, of the newly articulated standards will apply to all
disparate impact cases. And if the plurality is itself divided, or at least
undecided, on the application of its own new standards, this is perhaps
the clearest indication that the Court is in disarray in its approach to
disparate impact.
IV. CONCLUSION
The split of the Watson court and the importance of the Watson is-
sues virtually ensure that the Court will have another occasion to deal
with the disparate impact of subjective criteria.' 3 4 One would hope that
the Court will take the opportunity to deal with the problems raised by
Watson's approach and clarify its ambiguities. The Court should clarify
the following issues: (1) that while a plaintiff must specifically identify
the challenged practice, the entire procedure can be challenged if the
effects of its component parts cannot be separately analyzed; (2)
whether the defendant's burden is one of persuasion or production, and
if production, what quantity of evidence is required; (3) that while vali-
dation studies are not always required, they are the preferred evidence
and should be produced where the challenged practice is amenable to
validation study at reasonable cost; (4) that in stage three, the adequacy
of an alternate practice is determined by balancing the degree of less-
ened impact of the alternative procedure with the degree to which the
alternative procedure would also serve the employer's legitimate needs;
and (5) that the plaintiff need not prove that the alternative procedure
would serve the employer equally as well as the challenged procedure,
so long as it would serve reasonably well.
Until the Court addresses these areas, the language of the plurality
opinion will almost certainly invite inconsistent results in the lower
courts. The three-Justice concurring opinion authored by Justice Black-
mun pinpointed the source of the confusion, as the plurality frequently
affirmed traditional impact standards, then elaborated on those stan-
dards using language drawn from disparate treatment cases.1 3 5 Recon-
ciling these inconsistencies will be a challenging task for the lower
courts. The key to sound interpretation of this plurality opinion is to
look beyond a superficial reading of any single phrase, especially one
which is contradicted by another phrase or by the plurality's favorable
134. Atonio v. Ward's Cove Packing Co., 827 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108
S. Ct. 2896 (1988) now pending before the Court, provides one such opportunity. How-
ever, if the Court confines itself to the issues directly presented, many of the issues raised
by Watson will remain open.
135. Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2791-93. It is argued in Note, Title VII - Disparate Impact
Challenges to Subjective Employment Decisions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 308, 317-20 (1988), that the
plurality is attempting to reframe its basic doctrine of disparate impact analysis; i.e., view-
ing disparate impact as evidence of invidious intent rather than as a prohibited effect with-
out regard to intent. There are hints to that effect in the plurality decision. However, the
language of the plurality and its comprehensive rationale are simply too contradictory and
ambiguous to support a conclusion that Watson has so fundamentally altered disparate
impact doctrine.
[Vol. 66:2
1989] THE CHANGING FACE OF DISPARATE IMPACT 203
citation of traditional impact cases, to consider the chief object of the
opinion. The plurality is preserving and extending the impact model.
Reading in evidentiary standards which would effectively eviscerate the
model is not consistent with preserving it. However, standards which
are reasonable for objective practices, but impracticable for subjective
practices, may need to be relaxed. The plurality has not specifically de-
fined how this tailoring of the impact model is to be done. That task
now falls to the lower courts, guided by reason and a recognition of the
continuing importance of equal employment opportunity.

